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On What We Experience When We Hear People Speak 
 
Abstract According to perceptualism, fluent comprehension of speech is a perceptual 
achievement, in as much as it is akin to such high-level perceptual states as the perception of 
objects as cups or trees, or of people as happy or sad. According to liberalism, grasp of 
meaning is partially constitutive of the phenomenology of fluent comprehension. I here 
defend an influential line of argument for liberal perceptualism, resting on phenomenal 
contrasts in our comprehension of speech, due to Susanna Siegel and Tim Bayne, against 
objections from Casey O'Callaghan and Indrek Reiland. I concentrate on the contrast 
between the putative immediacy of meaning-assignment in fluent comprehension, as 
compared with other, less ordinary, perhaps translation-based ways of getting at the 
meaning of speech. I argue this putative immediacy is difficult to capture on a non-
perceptual view (whether liberal or non-liberal), and that the immediacy in question has 
much in common with that which applies in other, less controversial cases of high-level 
perception. 
 
Keywords: Speech Perception, The Experience of High-Level Properties, Perception and 
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1. Introduction 
When someone speaks within earshot in a language in which we are fluent, we inevitably, 
and seemingly immediately, register his or her vocalization as having a certain meaning. In 
this paper, I address two questions about such registrations, each of which has recently 
attracted much interest. 
First, what role does our grasp of meaning have for what it is like for us to take in the 
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utterance? According to “conservatism”, grasp of meaning is at most causally relevant to the 
phenomenal character of speech comprehension. Its phenomenal character, or 
phenomenology for short, consists entirely in lower-level sensory or affective 
phenomenologies: perceptual experiences of pitch, loudness, phonological structure, or 
mouth movements; sensory imagery; brute feelings of familiarity; or the like. On the rival, 
‘liberal’ view, grasp of meaning is part of, or partially constitutive of, what it is like for us to 
take in the utterance. To fully specify what it is like for us to register the utterance, one needs 
to specify what meaning we are understanding it to be expressing1. 
Second, to what extent is our grasp of the meaning of the vocalization a perceptual 
accomplishment? In other words, to what extent is grasp of meaning part of a perceptual 
impression of the utterance, and to what extent is it achieved only at an extra-perceptual 
level? According to what I shall call “perceptualism” grasp of meaning is achieved at a 
perceptual level; according to what I shall call “intellectualism” it is achieved only at an 
extra-perceptual cognitive level2. 
The two questions are logically and conceptually independent. Liberalism is consistent 
with perceptualism as well as intellectualism. For the liberal perceptualist, hearing familiar 
speech is, at a matter of its phenomenology, a perceptual experience of that speech as 
expressing a certain meaning. For the liberal intellectualist, in contrast, grasp of meaning is 
constitutive not of the phenomenal character of the specifically perceptual experience of the 
fluently understood speech, but only of the phenomenology of an extra-perceptual act of 
meaning-assignment. Likewise, conservatism is compatible with both perceptualism and 
intellectualism. For the conservative perceptualist, speech interpretation is a perceptual 
accomplishment, but one that is at most causally relevant to what it is like for us to 
understand speech. On this view, semantic representations would no more figure in the 
phenomenology of speech perception than, say, alleged early visual representations of 
binocular disparity figure in the phenomenology of vision3. Finally, on a conservative 
intellectualist view, assignment of meaning to speech is both extra-perceptual and extra-
phenomenological. 
                                                
1 Defenders of liberalism include Strawson 2011 and Siewert 2011. For conservatism, see, e.g., Carruthers 
& Veillet 2011 and Tye & Wright 2011. 
2 Perceptualism is defended by Pettit 2010, Azzouni 2013, and Brogaard forthcoming, amongst others; 
intellectualism inter alia by Stanley 2005 and O’Callaghan 2011. 
3 Conservative perceptualists are not, of course, committed to assigning the same status to perceptual 
representations of semantic properties as to alleged early visual representations of binocular disparity on any 
notion of consciousness. They are, for example, free to insist that the former are access conscious, but not the 
latter (cf. Block 1995). 
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I will here address the questions of liberalism vs. conservatism and perceptualism vs. 
intellectualism by considering an influential line of argument for liberal perceptualism, put 
forward by Siegel (2006) and Bayne (2009). Their argument relies on the widely agreed 
phenomenal contrast between hearing speech in an unfamiliar language – hearing it as mere 
sounds, as it is sometimes put – and hearing the same language being spoken when one has 
become fluent in the language. Siegel and Bayne argue that this contrast is best explained by 
a liberal perceptualist view, on which it is part of the phenomenology of the auditory 
experience of fluently understood speech that we hear it as expressing a certain meaning. 
Their argument has been criticised by O’Callaghan (2011), who offers an alternative, and, he 
argues, preferable, account of the phenomenal contrast here, according to which it is down to 
a shift in auditory phenomenology constituted by awareness of language-specific but non-
semantic features. Becoming fluent in a language, he observes, involves learning to hear its 
language-specific sounds. This affects what it is like to hear it. Recently, another, 
complementary critique of Siegel’s and Bayne’s argument has been offered by Reiland 
(2015). He argues that phenomenal contrasts in our registration of speech may be due to an 
extra-perceptual, cognitive phenomenology associated with the deployment of semantic 
competence. He suggests that an intellectualist account of this sort, appealing to extra-
perceptual cognitive phenomenology, can be given on both a conservative and a liberal view 
of the posited cognitive phenomenology here. 
In section 3 below, I outline, in somewhat greater detail, this just-sketched debate over 
Siegel’s and Bayne’s abductive, contrast-based, argument for liberal perceptualism. I also 
explain, drawing in part on arguments in Reiland, why O’Callaghan’s account does not seem 
to extend to all phenomenal contrasts in hearing speech. 
Section 4 turns to examining Reiland’s suggestion that cognitive phenomenology, of an 
extra-perceptual sort, can be invoked to handle phenomenal contrasts in our registration of 
speech – in particular: that it can account for any phenomenal contrasts to which an 
O’Callaghan-style treatment does not apply. I focus on what I shall dub “subtitle cases”. 
These are comparisons in which each of two hearers come to assign a certain meaning of 
some speech, say in Italian, and where a concurrent translation is provided, say in English, 
yet where only one of the hearers relies on the concurrent provision of a translation to 
understand the Italian speech. I suggest there can still be a phenomenal contrast in how the 
Italian speech is taken in here, and that this raises a challenge for the appeal to extra-
perceptual cognitive phenomenology. I consider, in turn, how a conservative and a liberal 
intellectualist can respond to it. Looking at some familiar conservative resources, e.g. 
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appealing to sensory imagery or to feelings of familiarity or of knowing, I find them lacking. 
I then turn to some liberal intellectualist options, including appealing to phenomenal 
objectual unity (versus lack of such unity) between semantic and lower-level auditory 
properties, and to sense of the causal dependence (versus lack of such a sense) of the 
entertaining of semantic content on the speech heard. I shall find that each of these options 
confronts a dilemma: either the posited phenomenology is perceptual, contrary to 
intellectualism, or it can be shared by someone limited to a non-fluent understanding of 
speech. 
Section 5 considers an intellectualist rejoinder to the dilemma just indicated. The rejoinder 
has it that we have underplayed the importance, even for the intellectualist, of the immediate, 
non-deliberate way in which understanding is reached, in the fluent case. Even for the 
intellectualist, this rejoinder has it, it is vital that ordinary fluent understanding is reached in 
a way that contrasts with, inter alia, conscious inference, testimony, wishful thinking, and 
several other cognitive processes. The question, though, is whether the intellectualist can 
characterize this ordinary, fluent way of achieving understanding without doing so in terms 
that suggest that it is perceptual. The perceptualist will object that the leading features of 
fluent comprehension, apt to cash out its distinctive immediacy as compared with less-than-
fluent comprehension, are characteristics shared with high-level perception, and that these 
features, taken together, support the classification of fluent comprehension as perceptual. I 
conclude that, at the least, an adequate intellectualist response to Siegel’s and Bayne’s 
contrast-based argument for liberal perceptualism remains to be given.  
However, before turning to the examination of this contrast-based argument, I pursue 
some ground-clearing, in section 2. What notion, or notions, of meaning, perception, and 
phenomenology are in play in these debates over liberalism vs conservatism, and 
perceptualism vs intellectualism? In particular, I consider in some detail how the choice 
between different candidate notions of meaning matters to these debates, notably the choice 
between less and more context-sensitive notions of meaning. 
 
2. On the notions of phenomenology, perception, and meaning in play 
So far, the issues at stake have been put in terms of whether grasp of meaning is part of 
phenomenology or of perception. What notions of “meaning”, “perception” and 
“phenomenology” are in question here? I will address them in reverse order, devoting by far 
the most attention to that of meaning.  
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2.1. "Phenomenology" 
I take “phenomenology” to refer to the defining dimension of experiential states or events 
– the states or events that make up our overall experience, our conscious, subjective, 
experiential life. The phenomenology, or phenomenal character, of such states or events 
consists in their specifically experiential, subjective properties, those that make up what it is 
like for the subject to be in the states or events in question. Although phenomenal character 
to be sure is well exemplified by the painfulness of pains, the radiant way the horizon is 
presented to one when seen at sunset, and kindred sensory-qualitative dimensions of 
conscious events, one should be careful not to definitionally restrict, right from the outset, 
phenomenal character to such sensory-qualitative paradigms. Believers in an irreducibly 
cognitive phenomenology believe conscious thoughts, experiences of understanding speech, 
sudden mathematical or moral insights, etc. have a phenomenal character of a quite different 
sort from these sensory-qualitative paradigms. 
 
2.2. "Perception" 
Talk of "perception" is sometimes understood by way of opposition to cognition, 
sometimes as a special case of cognition; accordingly, two diametrically opposed ways of 
talking could be distinguished: one on which anything which is perceptual ipso facto is not 
cognitive, and one on which it ipso facto is cognitive. I here adopt neither way of talking. As 
against the first, I leave open that there may be some overlap between perception and 
cognition; as against the second, I leave open that some aspects of perception may not be 
cognitive. We may refer to extra-perceptual cognitive processes as “intellectual”, in line with 
my labelling of the perceptualist’s opponent as the “intellectualist”, although that should not 
be taken to suggest that any intellectual process must be one of conscious, reflective 
reasoning, or a matter of general intelligence. While there are clear paradigms of perceptual 
and intellectual states or processes (e.g., seeing the shape of nearby objects, and deliberating 
about the cause of my car failing to start, respectively), there is no shortage of controversial 
cases, whose place in relation to the often-unclear boundary of the perceptual remains 
disputed (they include, of course, precisely the case of fluent speech comprehension). 
Relatedly, there are few uncontroversial necessary or sufficient conditions for a mental state 
to be perceptual. 
It would be widely agreed, though, that perception (or, perhaps more precisely, perceptual 
systems) has many of the interrelated features Fodor (1983) assigned to “input systems” and 
to modules more generally. To briefly record these features (in no particular order), 
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perceptual systems are (i) fast; (ii) mandatory, i.e., roughly, automatic, in their operation 
once spurred into operation; (iii) they develop with a characteristic pace and sequencing, in a 
largely culturally invariant way; (iv) they are susceptible of selective impairments that leave 
other cognitive and perceptual skills intact; (v) they are at least comparatively insulated from 
conflicting background beliefs, as shown by the persistence of illusions recognised as such4; 
(vi) they have what Fodor called a comparatively “shallow” output (a point we shall return to 
presently); (vii) they are domain specific, at least in the sense that they are stimulated into 
action by a specific, limited range of stimuli; (viii) in so far as perceptual systems rely on 
intermediate levels of representational states between initial stimulus and output, they exhibit 
limited conscious access to these interlevel representations; and (ix) they rely on dedicated 
neural hardware. We shall return to these marks in section 5 below, where we shall consider 
to what extent they are exhibited by speech comprehension.  
For now, I will briefly pick up on what Fodor alluded to with his talk of the “shallowness” 
of perceptual outputs. He took this to be a measure of the degree to which the 
informational/representational contents outputted by perception are constrained (1983, p. 87). 
Degree of shallowness, Fodor argues, connects closely with the question of inferential 
sensitivity to background beliefs:  
 
If, for example, the visual analysis system can report only upon the shapes and colors of things (all 
higher-level integrations being post-perceptual) it is correspondingly plausible that all the information 
that system exploits may be represented internal to it . By contrast, if the visual system can deliver news 
about protons …, then the likelihood that visual analysis is informationally encapsulated is negligible. 
Chat about protons surely implies free access to quite a lot of what I have been calling ‘background 
knowledge’ (1983, p. 87). 
 
Since Fodor holds perception to be encapsulated, this passage might be taken to suggest 
that he intends to limit its output to the representation of shapes and colours, or to 
representations with nonconceptual content5. Fodor argues, however, that some higher-level 
representational states, notably ones that classify things under such basic level categories as 
cat or dog, tree or table, or the like, are genuinely perceptual. I shall here follow this 
                                                
4 It will be noted that the feature indicated in the text here is weaker than what Fodor calls informational 
encapsulation, and which he regards as a key features of modules. I emphasise the weaker feature in the text 
here, which Fodor sees as good evidence of informational encapsulation, since it is less controversial that 
perception has it than informational encapsulation itself, especially for the case of high-level perception. We 
shall return to this point in section 0 below. 
5 For a construal of “shallow” output on which it involves a limitation to nonconceptual representations, see 
Carruthers 2006, p. 4.  
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assumption that at least some would-be “higher-level perception” is genuinely perceptual. 
This is in part because I take it to be plausible6. Moreover, it would be widely agreed that if 
understanding speech is ever perceptual, it would qualify as a form of high-level perception. 
If there is no such thing as higher-level perception, perceptualism is doomed. At the same 
time, it is at least very far from obvious that the question whether some form of higher-level 
perception is genuinely perceptual stands or falls with the question whether understanding 
speech ever is perceptual; it seems safe to say that some other putative cases of higher-level 
perception (including, for example, perception of people as undergoing certain emotions, cf. 
Block 2014) are arguable candidates, on arguably independent grounds, for genuinely 
perceptual status. Thus the assumption that some higher-level perception is genuinely 
perceptual does not beg the question at stake between perceptualists and intellectualists. If 
one is nevertheless sceptical of the assumption, the following can be read as an exploration 
of what could be said of understanding speech conditionally on its truth. The assumption 
will, in any case, turn out to matter, e.g. to the question just how strictly we can take certain 
Fodorian marks to apply to perception generally, considered to have high-level perception 
among its cases. 
In assuming that some high-level perceptions are genuinely perceptual, I do not yet mean 
to take a stand on their phenomenal character. I leave it open, at least for now, whether their 
phenomenology goes beyond that of lower-level perceptual states, and what the nature of any 
such further phenomenology might be. We return to the issue of the phenomenology of high-
level perceptual states in section 2.3.2 below 
 
2.3. "Meaning" 
In what sense of the word "meaning" is “grasp or meaning” supposed to be internal to the 
perception of speech (by perceptualists) or to the phenomenology of understanding speech 
(by liberalists)? Clearly, a wide range of candidate notions of meaning could be tabled here. 
Towards one extreme, there are rich notions, such as that of what a speaker meant, in uttering 
such-and-such, where this may include various propositions that were merely implicated (cf. 
Grice 1989). Towards another extreme, there are thin notions, such as that of the standing 
linguistic meaning of linguistic types, or what Kaplan dubbed character, i.e. a (perhaps 
constant) function from some feature of the context of utterance to a semantic value (Kaplan 
                                                
6 For one recent defence of the genuinely perceptual status of at least some cases of higher-level perception, 
see Block 2014. 
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1989). The character of a sentence will commonly fall short of determining a truth-evaluable, 
propositional content, e.g. for sentences with indexicals. In between the extremes, there are 
various intermediate options. Notably, there is the Gricean notion of what is said. More 
recently, other, somewhat thinner notions in this intermediate territory have been articulated, 
such as that of “minimal propositions”, where the minimal proposition expressed by a 
sentence, in a context of utterance, is truth-evaluable, as the Kaplanian character of the 
sentence will often not be, but typically fails to correspond to what is said by an utterance of 
that sentence in that context, being less context sensitive7. 
Since there is such a wide choice of different notions of meaning, there is a 
correspondingly wide range of candidate distinctions between liberalism and conservatism, 
and between perceptualism and intellectualism, in so far as these views are characterised in 
terms of whether “grasp of meaning” is internal to phenomenology, or perception. In the 
next two sub-sections, we shall see that the choice between the indicated notions of meaning 
matters to the debates in question. 
 
2.3.1. Choice of notion of meaning: bearing on perceptualism vs intellectualism 
The choice between different candidate notions of meaning is important to the issue 
between perceptualism and intellectualism. It matters to the plausibility of perceptualism. 
Implicatures at least sometimes quite literally need to be “worked out”, to use Grice’s phrase 
(1989). At least sometimes, the retrieval of implicatures requires a modicum of cognitive 
effort. For example it might require a brief moment’s thought to realize that B’s reply here: 
(1) A: Will you go to the party? 
B: I have work to do.  
implicates that B will not be going to the party8. If the relevant notion of what was meant by 
an utterance subsumes a moderately rich range of implicatures, and these implicatures not 
untypically are akin to that illustrated in (1) in respect of their processing demands, then 
perceptualism is not a credible view of how we grasp what was meant. 
Indeed, in some cases, it would seem that at most something akin to Kaplanian characters 
are candidates for being perceived. For example, suppose I overhear an utterance of (2) 
below, hearing it as emanating from a small group of people chatting behind me on the tram: 
                                                
7 A role for minimal propositions is defended by semantic minimalists, such as Borg 2012, and Cappelen 
&Lepore 2005. 
8 The example is due to Davis 2014. 
 9 
(2) I will lend you this one on Friday. 
I do not perceive who is speaking, whom is addressed, or what the speaker might be 
intending to refer to with “this one”. If I get what the utterer of (2) is saying here, on the 
Gricean notion of what is said, I will get it only because I can somehow infer the answers to 
these questions, or learn them from informants. I do not hear what the utterer is saying 
straight off. It seems that the most I will get perceptually here, and all I will get if I cannot 
infer or learn who is speaking, whom is addressed, etc., is that (2) expresses a certain 
character, call it C. 
This case might be taken to suggest that perceptualism will be easier to defend, the further 
one moves towards the thin, contextually invariant side among candidate notions of meaning. 
Another putative reason, pointing in the same direction here, is the following. It has been 
suggested that if, as perceptualists hold, there is a perceptual contrast between hearing speech 
with understanding, and hearing it uncomprehendingly, then that contrast ought to show up 
also when utterances of mere sub-sentential phrases or words are heard. Such utterances of 
sub-sentential phrases may well fall short of stating, affirming, questioning, or, more 
generally, saying something. Sub-sentential phrases, in other words, typically fall short of 
saying something. Let's look at an example. Perceptualist should be thinking, according the 
present suggestion, that there is a difference between hearing the Estonian word “jäääär” (i.e. 
“edge of ice”) in isolation, depending on whether you understand it or not, but, since the 
word does not say anything in isolation, the difference cannot have to do with whether 
something is registered as what it says9. Now, if perceptualism is to apply to one’s grasp of 
meaning when hearing the word “jäääär” in isolation here, and (accordingly) the relevant 
notion of meaning not be one of what is said (as nothing is said), then an obvious alternative 
is that the relevant notion of meaning is that of some invariant lexical meaning of the word. 
Further, if lexical meaning is all that is semantically perceived in these cases, and we want a 
uniform account of what is semanitically perceived in all cases of speech interpretation, 
perhaps the perceptualist more generally should identify the meaning that is perceived as one 
of lexical meaning. 
However, some sympathizers with perceptualism have argued that, at least typically, the 
most immediately consciously entertained item, when one fluently understands speech, 
corresponds to what is said therein, in something like Grice’s sense. Fricker writes, of a 
typical case where someone understands speech:  
                                                
9 For this argument, see Reiland 2015, pp. 487-489. 
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The most immediate personal-level psychological effect of her auditing of the utterance is that she 
enjoys a representation of a distinctive kind special to language understanding: a conscious 
representation of the content and force of the utterance. She hears the utterance not merely as sound but 
as the speech act that it is (Fricker 2003, p. 325). 
 
By “content” here, Fricker adverts to what is stated, asserted, questioned, or, in Grice’s 
generic sense, said in the utterance. Likewise, Brogaard (forthcoming) has recently argued, 
following Recanati (2004), that what is consciously available, in comprehending speech, is 
not typically some contextually invariant lexical meaning, but what is said in a given 
utterance. Brogaard’s argument invokes Recanati’s view that polysemy is rife in language. 
For example, a word such as “man” can mean: a male human being; any human being; an 
activity of getting people to take care of some task (“man the fleet”); an activity a serving in 
some task (“man the ticket booth”); etc. Any constant linguistic meaning, of the word “man”, 
must be such as to suit it for such a variety of expressive tasks; it cannot be limited to any 
one of the indicated meanings, but must either take the form of a list of them, or contain a 
few abstract, underspecifying features common to all of the indicated meanings, or have 
some other structure. Recanati contends it is implausible that we consciously entertain, 
perceptually or otherwise, such lexical meanings in ordinary speech interpretation. Thus, if a 
would-be perceptual access to meaning is supposed to be a case of conscious perception (as 
Brogaard argues it can and should be), the perceptualist must contend that the meaning that is 
perceptually accessed corresponds, at least typically, to what is said. 
Fricker’s and Brogaard’s contention that we can, and often do, have a perceptual, or at 
least quasi-perceptual, awareness of what is said, in an utterance, is consistent with allowing 
that such awareness is not possible in some situations, such as when I overhear (2) on the 
tram. The perceptibility of what is said will vary depending on whether some non-perceptual 
form of cognition is needed in order to determine what is said from hearing the utterance and 
one’s knowledge (such as it is) of the context10. Their contention is also consistent with the 
observation that there may well be a contrast between hearing a single word, such as “jäääär” 
in Estonian, between one who is fluent speaker and one who merely is familiar with the 
speech sounds of this language. The extent to which words are polysemous may vary. More 
importantly, even when a word is polysemous, it might be that one of its possible meanings 
                                                
10 This formulation of course makes salient the question just how to distinguish perceptual from non-
perceptual forms of cognition. This will be an important issue throughout this paper. We will return to it 
notably in section 5 below. 
 11 
tends to be accessed, by default, when it is uttered on its own. It is just that, on Fricker’s and 
Brogaard’s view, when one hears a word in isolation, especially a highly polysemous one 
(consider, for example, “over”, capable of meaning, roughly, and inter alia, above, greater 
than, across, on the other side of, covering, etc.), the perceptualist is not committed to 
thinking that there will be any determinate meaning that is perceived. 
In this paper, I follow Fricker and Brogaard in concentrating on the notion of what is said 
in an utterance, as a candidate for being what is accessed, perceptually, in understanding 
speech, at least in many typical cases. However, anyone who is at most willing to 
contemplate, as a credible candidate for being perceived, some less context-sensitive 
semantic properties, such as minimal propositions or even Kaplanian characters, could re-
interpret the arguments below in those terms. The claim that such semantic properties are 
perceptually represented would still be interesting and controversial11. 
 
2.3.2 Choice of notion of meaning: bearing on conservatism vs liberalism 
How, if at all, does the choice between the indicated notions of meaning matter to the 
issue between conservatism and liberalism about phenomenology? Before addressing this 
question directly, it will be helpful to take a few steps back. 
In the introduction above, we said the liberalist affirms, while the conservative denies, 
that grasp of meaning is partially constitutive of what it is like to take in an utterance that we 
understand. However, that remark should not be seen as an attempt to articulate the 
underlying, defining difference between liberalism and conservatism. Rather, it purports to 
point out a disagreement that flows from a more basic disagreement (or, at least: that flows 
from this more basic disagreement on at least some important notions of meaning). The 
underlying disagreement in question here is over a certain broadly reductive claim that the 
conservative affirms and the liberal denies. The claim has it, at least to a first approximation, 
that the phenomenology, if any, of any broadly cognitive mental act, such as one of 
understanding an utterance, reduces to the phenomenology of associated sensory or affective 
states12. On the intended construal, this claim, distinctive of conservatives, subsumes both an 
eliminationist view that just denies that there is any phenomenology applying to cognitive 
acts and a reductionist view that admits that there is some phenomenology applying to 
                                                
11 Writers, including O’Callaghan (2011) and Reiland (2015), who deny that we perceive meanings would 
presumably deny, in particular, that we perceive Kaplanian characters. 
12 This reductive claim is, roughly, the claim labelled “Reductionism” in Nes 2012. It is closely related to 
the claim Chudnoff (2015) dubs “Irreducibility”, viz. the claim that “Some cognitive states put one in 
phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice”. 
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cognitive acts (or, anyhow, interestingly associated with them) but that takes this 
phenomenology completely to reduce to the phenomenologies of associated sensory or 
affective states. However, the question arises here how broad the indicated reduction base, of 
'the phenomenologies of associated sensory and affective states' should be assumed to be. It 
is agreed that paradigmatic instances of phenomenally conscious sensory or affective states, 
for present purposes, include perceptual experiences of fine-grained paradigm sensible 
properties (colours, shapes, pitch, loudness, smoothness, etc), sensory imagery as of the same 
properties, and bodily sensations. I shall also assume that the reduction base includes certain 
“brute” epistemic or metacognitive feelings, such as a brute sense of familiarity or of déjà vu. 
To say that these are “brute” is to say that their phenomenal character is supposed to be 
individuated without reference to the conceptual content, if any, of these feelings. I include 
such feelings here in part as they have been invoked as a resource by such conservatives as 
Carruthers and Veillet (2011). 
One key question, though, is how we are to classify high-level perceptual states for 
present purposes13. If the phenomenology of high-level perception reduces to the 
phenomenology of perceiving various constellations of colours, shapes, etc., then nothing 
hangs on this classification: admitting higher-level perceptions into the reduction base of 
“sensory or affective states” will not make a difference to what can be reduced to this base, 
assuming that reduction is transitive. However, suppose, alternatively, that the high-level 
perception has a phenomenology that is irreducible to the phenomenology of perceiving 
various constellations of colours, shapes, etc. Should that supposition be regarded as 
inconsistent with conservatism? Or should we rather view it as consistent with conservatism, 
and indeed as revealing that the conservative’s reduction base of “the phenomenology of 
sensory or affective states” is richer than the list of paradigms above? 
This depends, I think, on the explanation of the supposed phenomenological irreducibility 
of the relevant high-level states to lower-level ones. We may distinguish two options here. 
Suppose, first, that the distinctive phenomenology of the high-level perception is constituted, 
in part, by the activation of what we may call a cognitive/conceptual capacity. For example, 
suppose it constitutively involves deploying a sortal concept that the thinker also can deploy 
in her judgements and reasoning. In that case, it seems there would be a distinctively 
cognitive/conceptual contribution to the phenomenology of the high-level perception. I shall 
                                                
13 High-level imaginative states, such as visualizing a car (as such), raises much the same questions. For 
simplicity, and since they are more directly relevant to our present concern with perceptualism vs 
intellectualism, I focus on the case of high-level perception. 
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take it that a so constituted phenomenology ought to be excluded from the conservative’s 
reduction base14. This is because some notable conservatives, such as Tye (2003) and 
Carruthers & Veillet (2011), deny precisely that there is any such distinctively 
cognitive/conceptual constitutive contribution to phenomenology. In the current dialectical 
context, a further reason for making this restriction is the following. If any phenomenology 
of any high-level perceptual state is regarded as conservatively kosher, just by virtue of 
applying to a perceptual state, there is no room debate between liberals and conservatives 
about the phenomenology of understanding speech if perceptualism is right. On 
perceptualism, fluent speech comprehension is a high-level perceptual state; its 
phenomenology would, of course, trivially reduce to itself, and so conservatism would hold 
good by default.  
The second, alternative option to consider here is the following. Suppose, that the 
distinctive phenomenology of the high-level perception is fully accounted for by its 
manifesting a capacity shared with paradigm sensory states, but not with acts of judgement 
or reasoning. For example, suppose it derives from one’s achieving, in the high-level 
perception, a form of acquaintance or direct awareness with the sortal kind that is perceived 
to be instantiated, where this form of acquaintance or direct awareness is unavailable in mere 
thinking or reasoning about the kind in question15. In that case, no distinctively cognitive 
phenomenology would seem to be realized in the case at hand; rather, the special higher-
level phenomenology realized in the high-level perception would be due to an expansion of 
the range of a strictly perceptual relation, not to the activation in perception of a 
cognitive/conceptual capacity, such as concept also deployed in non-perceptual thinking. At 
the very least, then, the conservative would not, on this second supposition, have reasons for 
excluding the higher-level phenomenology from her reduction base on the ground that it 
imports a distinctively cognitive/conceptual contribution. So perhaps she would be prepared 
to include such higher-level, yet still distinctively perceptual, phenomenology16. 
We can now return to the question how the choice between different notions of meaning 
bears on the issue between conservatism and liberalism. Should the existence of a 
phenomenology that constitutively includes grasp of meaning, and is irreducible to low-level 
                                                
14 In the terms of Nes 2012, this is to construe conservatism as committed to “hard-line reductionism”. 
15 Just to make clear: I do not mean to take a stand here on whether it is so much as possible to have 
acquaintance or direct awareness of sortal kinds. 
16 We could distinguish a stronger or weaker form of conservatism here, depending on whether or not it 
would be prepared to allow for the existence of such a higher-level, yet still distinctively perceptual, 
phenomenology. 
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sensory or affective states, be regarded as incompatible with conservatism on any of the 
indicated notions of meaning, or at most on some of them? It is quite clearly incompatible 
with conservatism on some notions of meaning. The latter include the familiar notion of what 
is said in an utterance. Suppose an utterance is one of saying that P, and you understand it as 
such, grasping the proposition that P as what is said in that utterance. This requires that you 
entertain the proposition that P in such a way that you have the cognitive wherewithal for 
acts of judging, rejecting, supposing or querying whether that P. For example, if someone 
lacks the cognitive capacity to judge, question, suppose or otherwise cognitively entertain the 
proposition that cats are mammals, we would not allow that they understood what someone 
said in affirmatively uttering “Cats are mammals”. The act of grasping an asserted, stated, 
proffered, or otherwise said proposition that P, required for grasping what is said in an 
utterance, thus seems to be the activation of a cognitive/conceptual capacity. 
The matter is less clear-cut for some of the thinner, less context sensitive notions of 
meaning. For example, suppose that, when I overhear (2) uttered behind me on the tram, I am 
representing it as expressing C, where C is its complex Kaplanian character, composed from 
the characters of its constituent words. Since C is not a propositional content (it is not 
evaluable for truth), there is no such thing as judging, supposing, or querying whether C. 
Moreover, C is not a singular or general concept that the thinker can embed in complete, 
truth-evaluable thought by combining it with other concepts she possesses. In other words, C 
is neither itself a propositional content nor a potential constituent of a complete truth-
evaluable thought. It does not seem to be the kind of thing that someone can think with17. 
Further, it might seem that an ordinary speaker may well lack conceptual resources to think 
about C18. Clearly, she may lack such concepts as character, or function from such-and-such 
feature of context to thing referred to, etc. Perhaps she can provide more informal glosses of 
C or its constituent characters. For example, with regard to “you”, perhaps she can say 
something along the lines of “by ‘you’, whoever is speaking means the person whom he or 
                                                
17 This assessment will no doubt be challenged by some. See, e.g., Pitt 2013 for the suggestion that many or 
even all of our concepts, or the building blocks of our thought, are akin to Kaplanian characters. I am here 
assuming that concepts are so individuated that it is part of their functional role that they have, across their 
deployments, a unique reference in each circumstance of evaluation. (Note that, this can be part of the 
functional role of a concept – of how it is “supposed to” work in our cognitive economy – even if the relevant 
concept happens to fail to have a reference, or undergo a shift in reference.) Kaplanian characters 
uncontroversially do not have such a role: there is no unique person “you” is supposed to refer to whenever 
deployed. I will not pursue the matter any further here, as it would take us too far afield. For now, suffice to 
note that Pitt (2013) himself acknowledges his view as an unusual one. 
18 The distinction invoked here, between thinking with something and thinking about something, is drawn 
from Byrne 2005. 
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she was talking to”. Yet it seems a speaker may well have to engage in some reflection to 
articulate even such a rough gloss; it is not clear that she would be expressing a concept of C 
– or, rather, of the contribution “you” makes to C, call it Cyou – that she already deploys 
merely by virtue of representing (2) as expressing C. Alternatively, it might be suggested that 
the speaker has a concept of C precisely because she conceives of it as a meaning of (2). This 
cannot be the full story of how C is represented, however. Suppose I read on a map in Paris, 
“Vous êtes ici”. Being ignorant of French, I do not understand it. Yet I am quite capable of 
representing “Vous êtes ici” as meaning (trivially) what “Vous êtes ici” means. Thus the 
suggestion is unilluminatingly circular. The question we are asking is, “In representing ‘you’ 
to mean Cyou, how is it that one is mentally representing the relevant function here, i.e. 
Cyou?”. It is unhelpful to answer, “One is representing Cyou as something ‘you’ means”. It is 
at least not clear, then, that ordinary speakers who understand (2) in the way I understand it 
when I overhear it on the tram, need to have the cognitive capacity to think with, or think 
about, C. Thus, if, in understanding (2) in the way I understand it on the tram, ordinary 
speakers represent (2) as expressing C, then this representational state is at least not clearly a 
distinctively cognitive/conceptual one, in the sense of manifesting the exercise of 
representational capacities also exercisable in paradigm cognitive acts of judging, reasoning, 
etc. Another way of putting the point is that the relevant representational state, in which (2) is 
represented as expressing C, qualifies as having nonconceptual content, in the sense that the 
canonical specification of its content will make use of concepts which the subject of the 
representational state need not possess, assuming that possession of concepts requires the 
capacity to deploy them in judging, reasoning, etc.19. 
Should we conclude, then, that it would be consistent with conservatism to take the 
phenomenology of my understanding of (2), when I overhear it on the tram, to be partially 
constituted by my representing (2) as meaning C, on the grounds that this is a nonconceptual 
representation, not involving the activation of concepts? I am doubtful. Although 
representing (2) as meaning C might not qualify as a conceptual representational state in the 
sense that the subject must possess all the concepts used in the canonical specification of its 
content (assuming, here, that possession of concepts in turn requires the capacity to deploy 
                                                
19 If there is such a thing as a conscious or personal-level representation of utterances, such as (2), as 
expressing a certain character, and these representations are nonconceptual in the indicated sense, it amounts to 
an interesting expansion of commonly recognised candidate domain for nonconceptual representation content. 
The commonly recognised candidates for the nonconceptual content are limited to lower-level perceptual 
states, such as visual experiences of fine-grained colours or shapes, and sub-personal representational states, 
see Bermudez & Cahen 2012. 
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them in thinking), it might still be the activation of a capacity that is reasonably regarded as 
belonging with cognitive/conceptual capacities, for present purposes. I will briefly note two 
pertinent considerations here. First, the capacity to represent utterances as expressing a 
certain character seems to have a compositional structure. The character of a semantically 
complex expression is compositionally arrived at on the basis of the characters of its 
constituent expressions in a way that mirrors how the propositional content of a complex 
expression is compositionally arrived at from the semantic values of its constituents. To 
qualify as understanding what is said by a sentence one must exhibit some sensitivity to how 
this composition works. Similarly, if overhearing (2) involves representing it as having a 
certain complex character, C, one would expect this capacity to exhibit a sensitivity to how 
this composition of complex characters, from the characters of the constituents, works. So 
one would expect a deep structural commonality between the representation of what is said 
in an utterance and the representation of its character20. If the former is a paradigmatically 
cognitive/conceptual representation, this gives some support to classifying the latter with 
cognitive/conceptual forms of representation. Second, it is not clear what interesting 
commonalities that the representation of (2) as expressing C would have with 
paradigmatically sensory experience of objects or properties. For one thing, it seems 
characteristic of sensory awareness of objects or properties that it enables one, given that one 
has the general capacity for demonstrative thinking, to think demonstratively of the objects 
or properties in question21. Seeing a tennis ball before me, I can think of it as that one; 
looking at a paint sample, I can think of the shade it presents to me as that shade. Does the 
representation of an utterance, such as (2), as having a certain character come with any 
corresponding tendency to enable demonstrative thought about the character in question? On 
the face of it, it does not seem very compelling to think that it does. I will not here attempt to 
argue, from more basic constraints on demonstrative thought, that no such demonstrative 
thought about character would be enabled. I just record finding it hard to see how an 
independent motivation for positing such an ability could be provided. If, then, the 
representation of (2) as having a character C contrasts with perceptual awareness in this 
respect, and shares, with paradigmatically cognitive/conceptual representations of what is 
                                                
20 In the terms of Fodor (2007, pp. 107-108), one would expect the representation of (2) as having a certain 
character to be a discursive, rather than an iconic, representation, in that it would have a canonical 
decomposition: not all of its parts would be constituents (in the sense of representationally significant parts) 
thereof. 
21 For a defence of such a link, see, e.g., Tye 2009. The statement of the link in the text is likely over-
simplified in various ways (for one thing, it does not mention the role of attention). 
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said, that it requires a sensitivity to compositional structure, there seems to be some grounds 
for regarding it as the exercise of a cognitive/conceptual capacity. 
If this is the right way to classify it, then there are grounds for regarding the supposition 
that it is partially constitutive of what it is like for me to understand (2), when I overhear it 
on the tram, that I represent (2) as expressing C as not compatible with conservatism. It 
would turn out that, whether meaning takes the form of what is said or something less 
context sensitive such as character, grasp of meaning cannot be partially constitutive of the 
phenomenology of understanding, on conservatism. However, in light of the not-clearly-
conceptual status of the representation of character, this verdict should be considered more 
qualified and provisional for the case of character than for that of what is said. 
 
3. Phenomenal contrast I and II: alien speech vs fluency, and mere phonological vs 
semantic competence 
It is widely agreed that there typically would be a phenomenal contrast between hearing 
speech in an unfamiliar language, and hearing the same speech in the same language at a 
later stage, having become perfectly fluent in the language. The overall experiences of taking 
in the speech differ in phenomenal character, as between the as-yet-unfamiliar and the by-
now-fluent case. Siegel (2006) and Bayne (2009) have argued that the phenomenal contrast 
here is best explained by a certain liberal perceptualist hypothesis. Their hypothesis could be 
construed as having two planks. The first plank is that the difference in phenomenal 
character between the overall experiences here consists, in part, in a phenomenal difference 
between the auditory experiences involved. The second plank is the claim that phenomenal 
difference between the auditory experiences consists, perhaps in part, in the presence versus 
the absence of an auditory representation of the meaning of the heard speech. It is the second 
plank here that makes their view perceptualist, in that it claims that a representation of 
meaning is achieved at the level of auditory experience. It is also this second plank that 
makes their view liberal, in that this representation of meaning is held to be partially 
constitutive of the phenomenology of the experience in question. 
Siegel’s and Bayne’s abductive argument here has been criticised by O’Callaghan (2011). 
He does not deny the first plank of Siegel’s and Bayne’s hypothesis, i.e. that there is a 
phenomenal contrast in auditory experience in the relevant cases. His disagreement is with 
the second plank. O’Callaghan observes that achieving fluency in a language involves 
acquiring a facility for registering not only meaning-properties of the relevant language, but 
also several non-semantic language-specific properties thereof. Notably, one needs to master 
 18 
the phonemic structure of the language and become capable of detecting word boundaries. 
These capacities will not typically be in place for an as yet un-mastered non-native language. 
In contrast, when one has become capable fluently of interpreting speech in that language, 
one not only grasps its meaning but registers these non-semantic, language-specific features. 
Thus an alternative, and arguably simpler explanation of the phenomenal contrast in auditory 
experience here puts it down to awareness of these non-semantic, language-specific features. 
However, it seems there can be phenomenal contrasts in hearing speech to which 
O’Callaghan’s account does not apply. One case for thinking so is offered in an earlier paper 
by Pitt (2004, p. 28-29). Instead of hearing speech in an unfamiliar language, he considers 
hearing an utterance of an unfamiliar sentence in one’s own language, such as:  
(3) The rhodomontade of ululating funambulists is never idoneous. 
Pitt argues, plausibly, that many competent English speakers will be familiar with the 
phonology of this sentence, and parse it correctly, even if they fail to understand it. He 
maintains moreover that there can be a phenomenal contrast here with someone who fluently 
understands (3). If so, it will be one to which O’Callaghan’s treatment does not apply.  
In a recent paper, Reiland (2015) provides other arguments in favour of the existence of 
phenomenal contrasts in hearing speech that cannot be accounted for by a difference in one’s 
familiarity with the speech sounds involved. He argues that one can be phonologically 
competent in a language without being semantically competent in it, and so not 
understanding it. For example, hearing a lot of Spanish music can make one familiar with the 
phonology of that language, without thereby coming to know what its words or sentences 
mean. (Suppose that one hears a lot of music videos in Spanish, with the Spanish words 
appearing, Karaoke style, as subtitles as they are sung. This would facilitate picking up on 
word boundaries.) Similarly, opera singers who sing much in Italian can become highly 
competent in the speech sounds of that language without necessarily understanding what they 
sing. Further, Reiland observes, those who move from one language community to a quite 
different one at an early age, having only spoken the language of their initial community for 
a short while, and from then on only using their second language, can retain phonological 
competence for their native language, whilst often being unable to understand utterances in 
it. Now, if we compare hearing speech in a language in which one is fluent with hearing the 
same speech in a language in which one is merely phonologically competent, there can still 
be a phenomenal contrast, or so Reiland plausibly suggests. The latter contrast could not be 
accounted for by the considerations invoked by O’Callaghan. 
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However, Reiland shares O’Callaghan’s reservations towards the liberal perceptualism of 
Siegel and Bayne, agreeing with O’Callaghan that an alternative explanation is to be 
favoured. His suggestion, for phenomenal contrasts to which O’Callaghan’s treatment does 
not apply, is to reject the first plank of Siegel and Bayne’s hypothesis, i.e. their suggestion 
that the phenomenal contrast in the overall experience of taking in the speech consists, in 
part, in a phenomenal contrast in the auditory experiences involved. An alternative and, he 
argues, preferable account of these differences is to take them to be due to phenomenologies 
associated with the (extra-perceptual) employment of semantic competence. Reiland is 
neutral between a conservative and a liberal view of the phenomenology associated with this 
employment. For the conservative, the suggestion would be that the employment of semantic 
competence comes with “sensory phenomenal accompaniments, like a feeling of familiarity 
or some sort of imagery” (2015, p. 491). On a liberal version, in contrast, that deployment 
might well involve a “distinctive cognitive phenomenology” (ibid.); plausibly, a 
phenomenology that constitutively involves grasping the meaning the vocalization is 
understood to have. 
I agree that there can be phenomenal contrasts where the hearer, in each case, accurately 
perceives the phonetic structure, word boundaries, and indeed the syntax of some 
vocalizations, but grasps their meaning in one case only. I also agree that, in some sense, the 
phenomenal contrast here is due to phenomenological contribution associated with the 
employment of semantic competence. As I am here working with a broad conception of 
“cognitive phenomenology”, where it suffices for phenomenology to be cognitive that it 
constitutively involves activating a cognitive/conceptual capacity, I agree, indeed, that the 
distinctive phenomenology involved in the fluent understanding of speech is a matter of 
cognitive phenomenology. However, on this broad conception, cognitive phenomenology is 
not necessarily entirely extra-perceptual; rather, it is up for grabs that perceptual experience 
can be laden or impregnated with cognitive phenomenology. The question, then, is whether 
the appeal to extra-perceptual cognitive phenomenology can do justice to the 
phenomenology of fluent understanding. 
 
4. Phenomenal contrasts III: Subtitle Cases 
Let us consider some cases that match Reiland’s except that a concurrent translation is 
added. I shall call them “subtitle cases”. It seems that adding such a translation does not 
entirely cancel out the phenomenal contrast in how the speech is taken in. 
Subtitle cases have the following structure. A hearer is (i) presented, at one and the same 
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time, with an utterance and an inscription, belonging to different languages, or, perhaps, to 
different vocabularies from the same language; (ii) the utterance and the inscription have the 
same meaning (and the speaker knows, e.g. on the basis of prior testimony, previous 
experience, or in some other way, that they do); (iii) the hearer is phonologically (and 
syntactically) competent with respect to both the utterance and the inscription; and (iv) the 
hearer is semantically competent with regards to either (a) only the inscription or (b) both the 
utterance and the inscriptions. I shall suggest that there can be a phenomenal contrast 
depending on whether (i)-(iv.a) or (i)-(iv.b) holds good.  
For example, suppose that Rosemary and Blanche are fluent in English. Rosemary is 
fluent in Italian, whilst Blanche is merely phonologically competent in that language, having 
sung many times an aria in it, but never having learned the meaning of the words she has 
been singing. They are now watching a video where someone is speaking in Italian. At the 
same time, English translations appear as subtitles (they know them to be accurate). Here 
Blanche’s case illustrates (i)-(iv.a), Rosemary’s (i)-(iv.b)22. It seems to me there would 
typically be a phenomenal contrast here in how they experience the Italian. At least, this 
seems plausible to me, given that there can be a phenomenal contrast in such cases as 
considered by Reiland above, i.e. such cases are just like our current subtitle case minus the 
subtitles. For, surely, merely adding the known concurrent translations does not entirely 
cancel out the contrast in how Blanche and Rosemary experience the Italian speech. It is not 
to Blanche as though she all of a sudden – and quite miraculously! – understands Italian, just 
because the subtitles are added. To just gesture at the contrast involved here, we might say 
that Rosemary, but not Blanche, somehow hears the Italian words, as they are being spoken, 
as meanings such-and-such. Rosemary, but not Blanche, as it were hears through the words 
to their meanings. As their names suggest: Rosemary’s experience of Italian is full of 
semantic spice, Blanche’s is comparatively semantically bland. 
Now, it might be pointed out that, for Blanche, there is a certain temporal structure in how 
she takes in the Italian. She first has to interpret the subtitles to get at their meaning, before 
attributing that meaning to the Italian speech. So it is possible to make a distinction between 
how that speech is presented to her before and after that attribution. However, although some 
phenomenal shifts may be associated with that distinction, I do not think it upsets the fact 
that there is, throughout, a difference in how Blanche and Rosemary take in the Italian 
speech. Whether the comparison between Blanche and Rosemary is made with respect to a 
                                                
22 Our hearers divide their attention, to the same degree, between the vocalization and the inscription. 
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time before Blanche makes a semantic attribution to the Italian speech or whether it is made 
with regards to a time at which she is making such an attribution, there seems to be a 
phenomenal contrast here. 
If there are such phenomenal contrasts in a subtitle case, how can we account for them? 
After all, the semantically disadvantaged subject in our case, Blanche, does employ semantic 
competence. She fluently grasps the meaning of the English inscriptions, and, knowing them 
to be translations of the Italian vocalizations, correctly attributes those meanings to the latter. 
At least at first blush, then, this creates something of a challenge for the suggestion that the 
contrast here might be due to an extra-perceptual cognitive phenomenology associated with 
the employment of semantic competence23. I shall discuss the conservative and liberal 
options here in turn. 
 
4.1 A conservative intellectualist treatment of Subtitle Cases 
On the conservative view of the relevant phenomenology, the phenomenology here is 
exclusively a matter of lower-level sensory or affective phenomenology. For concreteness, 
suppose Rosemary and Blanche hear “Il gatto è sul tappeto” being spoken, whilst the 
translation “The cat is on the mat” appears. Upon taking this in, and deploying her semantic 
competence, Blanche may have visual imagery as of cats on mats (or, perhaps, because of 
some logic book she read back in the days, auditory imagery as of the name “Barwise”). A 
tiny warm glow of affection (her being partial to cats), and a familiar homely feeling (her 
always having had a cat at home) may be kindled in her breast. However, Rosemary, being 
as similar to Blanche as their different levels of competence in Italian allows, may well enjoy 
such imagery and affections too. The presence of such imagery or affections, related to the 
semantic contents of the phrases they are taking in, does not seem capable of accounting for 
the phenomenal contrast in how they are experiencing the Italian speech. 
What about imagery or affections specifically directed at, or associated with, the Italian 
speech? Could it be that Rosemary enjoys, whilst Blanche distinctively lacks, a certain 
feeling of familiarity about the Italian speech? Could it be that Rosemary takes in and 
processes these words with a certain fluency, one Blanche falls short of? It is not clear, 
however, just what sort of difference would have to obtain here. It seems Blanche, for all we 
have said, might well enjoy various sorts of feelings of familiarity or fluency about the 
                                                
23 I am not the first to have appealed to the contrast between ordinary fluent understanding of speech and a 
translation-based understanding to make a case for the perceptual, or at least quasi-perceptual, status of fluent 
understanding. Similar considerations are advanced in Fricker 2003. 
 22 
Italian speech. She might have sung many an Italian song where that very phrase, “Il gatto è 
sul tappeto”, have prominently figured. These words by no means strike her as unfamiliar. 
Moreover, we may assume that a more semantically based feeling of familiarity is 
operative in Blanche’s case, exemplifying a form of what students of metacognition call a 
“feeling of knowing”. An everyday example of having a feeling of knowing – in particular, a 
feeling of knowing the meaning of some word – would be the following. Reading some 
medical literature (as I rarely do), I come across the word “iatrogenic”. I may have a feeling 
of familiarity about this word that does not merely involve the feeling of having heard, seen, 
or even voiced it before, but also a feeling of knowing what it means, although I do not yet 
recall what it means, and even cannot recall it, if I try. However, if I were presented with an 
explanation of the word (e.g. “adverse effects of health care interventions”), I would 
immediately recognise it as something that I, at some level, knew all along. Indeed, my 
feeling of knowing the meaning makes me confident that I would recognise a correct 
explanation of the word, if presented with one. I take it that my feeling of knowing the 
meaning of the word here is phenomenologically quite different from the experience of 
immediately understanding the same word as having such-and-such a meaning. 
Now, to return to Blanche, and her experience of taking in “Il gatto è sul tappeto”, we 
may assume that these words have been explained to her at some point in the past, and that, 
as a result, a feeling of knowing their meanings immediately is kindled in her upon hearing 
them. Since she gets the English translation, that feeling swiftly gives way to the recognition 
that “Oh yeah, that is what these words are saying”. Even so, her experience of taking in the 
Italian speech would seem relevantly unlike Rosemary’s. 
A feeling of familiarity with words, a feeling of knowing their meaning, or low-level 
sensory imagery or affections related to the meanings of words, thus seem to be insufficient 
to capture the specific ways in which Rosemary’s fluent understanding of the Italian speech 
is phenomenologically different from Blanche’s more indirect grasp of its meaning. Are 
there any other, low-level sensory or affective phenomenologies here that could only be 
present in Rosemary’s case, i.e. that would turn Blanche’s case to Rosemary’s, if Blanche 
had them? Although I fail to see just what these might be, I will not purport to exclude the 
possibility here. As I take conservatism to be independently implausible, I shall conclude 
merely that the challenge arising here for the conservative intellectualist seems a live one24. 
 
                                                
24 For arguments against conservativism, see Chudnoff 2016, Nes 2012, and Strawson 2011. 
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4.2. A liberal intellectualist treatment of Subtitle Cases 
What about the version that takes a liberal view of phenomenology? For the liberalist, the 
special phenomenology enjoyed by Rosemary may be of a higher-level, more cognitive sort. 
It might constitutively involve entertaining conceptual content. This content might be 
representing that the cat is on the mat, or perhaps that such-and-such an utterance or uttered 
sentence has the property of meaning that the cat is on the mat. Again, however, the 
indicated, conceptually laden forms of phenomenology do not, on their own, explain how 
Rosemary differs from Blanche. Nothing prevents Blanche from consciously entertaining the 
proposition The cat is on the mat, or mentally representing the property of meaning that the 
cat is on the mat. Indeed, she likely entertains this proposition, and may well consciously 
represent it as what is meant not only by the English inscription but also by the Italian 
speech. Thus there still remains a challenge, for the liberal intellectualist, to account for how 
Blanche and Rosemary differ in their experience of the Italian speech. I shall now consider 
some moves the liberal intellectualist might try here. 
First, the liberal intellectualist might argue that, for Blanche, any representation of the 
semantic properties of the Italian speech would not be unified with the experience of hearing 
it in quite the way it is for Rosemary. After all, in so far as Blanche represents the Italian 
speech as having such-and-such a meaning (e.g. as meaning that the cat is on the mat), this 
representation is somehow mediated by and based on her interpretation of the English 
inscription. The liberal intellectualist might elaborate the difference in unity here in terms of 
Bayne and Chalmers’ notion of objectual unity. They give the following example of the 
absence of such unity: 
 
[T]wo experiences can be experiences of the same object without being objectually unified. I might see 
a car’s shape and hear its noise, without anything in my conscious state tying the noise to the car 
(perhaps I perceive the noise as behind me, due to an odd environmental effect). If so, the experiences 
are not objectually unified (Bayne & Chalmers 2003, p. 25). 
 
In contrast, in many everyday cases of seeing a car driving past, the properties of having a 
certain vehicular shape, a certain colour, making certain sounds, etc. are objectually unified: 
it is a feature of the phenomenal character of the experience that is presented to one that one 
and the same thing has these various properties. Plausibly, the term “objectual unity” should 
not be construed so as to require that the “same thing” here, i.e. the unity that is given as 
jointly bearing a range of different properties, must be an object as opposed, say, to an event. 
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A range of properties can be objectually unified in that they are all given as applying to a 
single event. To take one simple case, loudness and pitch can be objectually unified for me in 
my experience of a certain chime of a church bell: that chime can be given to me as at once 
loud and deep. Thus, we can ask, in particular, what properties are objectually unified for one 
in one’s experience of a certain Italian vocalization? The present liberal intellectualist 
proposal is that, for Rosemary, semantic properties thereof are objectually unified with 
various lower-level auditory properties, whereas, for Blanche, they are not. 
This account fails. Either the liberal intellectualist holds that the objectual unity between 
semantic and lower-level audible properties attained by Rosemary is a perceptual 
accomplishment, or the liberal intellectualist does not. In other words, either the liberal 
intellectualist claims that the objectual unity is a feature of the phenomenology of 
Rosemary’s auditory experience, or she does not make that claim. Suppose she makes that 
claim. Then the contention that the attainment of objectual unity between semantic and 
lower-level auditory properties as loudness, pitch, etc of is limited to Rosemary is plausible. 
But the resulting view is incompatible with intellectualism. If certain semantic properties of 
the vocalization are objectually unified with loudness, pitch, etc. at the level of the auditory 
experience of the vocalization, then the semantic properties must be part of the 
representational content of the auditory experience. But this is just what the intellectualist 
denies. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that the relevant objectual unity need not be a perceptual 
achievement. Then the claim that Blanche fails to achieve such unity – that such unity is the 
preserve of Rosemary –is dubious. Properties that are, uncontroversially, discerned in a 
cognitive, extra-perceptual act may be objectually unified with sensible properties. Here is 
one illustration. Suppose I see two similar pens on a table before me. Someone lets me know 
that one of them used to belong to Wittgenstein. The property of having belonged to 
Wittgenstein will not yet thereby be objectually unified with either one of the two pens seen. 
However, my informant then lets me know, further, that it was, in fact, the left pen that was 
Wittgenstein’s. It likely will, then, become part of the phenomenology of my overall 
perceptual cum cognitive experience that this pen here, having such-and-such a shape, 
colour, texture, etc., also belonged to Wittgenstein. Thus the property of having belonged to 
Wittgenstein becomes objectually unified, through my testimonially based judgement, with 
various lower-level visible properties in my experience of the pen. Clearly, such objectual 
unity between post-perceptually discerned semantic properties and audible properties is very 
much open to Blanche, in our case. She judges that The cat is on the mat is what the Italian 
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vocalization, experienced as being so-and-so loud, nasal, etc., is meaning. Perhaps the liberal 
intellectualist will protest, at this point, that this sort of unification between semantic and 
lower-level audible properties was not what she had in mind when she claimed it to be 
characteristic of Rosemary. The problem, of course, is to spell out what this distinctive sort 
of unity is, without getting impaled on the first horn of the dilemma. 
A second strategy the liberal intellectualist might pursue is to invoke causal 
consciousness. The idea here is as follows. Rosemary finds herself having in mind the 
thought that the cat is on the mat as a direct result of the Italian speech she is hearing. Not 
only does her entertainment of that thought as a matter of fact arise from that vocalization; it 
is a feature of what it is like for her to take in the speech that she is somehow aware of her 
thinking of that proposition as conveyed to her by the token speech, or so it might be argued. 
It is represented in her overall experience that this vocalization here is causing her to 
entertain the proposition that the cat is on the mat25. This representational content, moreover, 
is partially constitutive of the phenomenology of her overall experience. So, anyhow, the 
present suggestion goes. Blanche, in contrast, gets to entertain the proposition about the cat 
and the mat only through reading the English words. Again, the present suggestion avers, this 
causal fact is not entirely external to the character of her awareness. It is part of her 
experience that these written words on the screen there kindle in her the thought that the cat 
is on the mat. However, she has no awareness of that thought as arising from the Italian 
speech. The present liberal intellectualist strategy, then, is to suggest that such differences in 
their causal consciousness account for the phenomenal difference between Rosemary and 
Blanche. The one is aware of her thought as arising from the speech, the other as kindled by 
the words.  
This second liberal intellectualist suggestion encounters, I will argue, essentially the same 
difficulty as the first. Either the posited causal consciousness is supposed to be a perceptual 
achievement, or it is not. Let us first consider the option that it is perceptual. In other words, 
the posited causal consciousness is a feature of the auditory experience of the vocalization. 
Somehow, the auditory experience represents the vocalization as causing this very 
entertainment of the thought that the cat is on the mat (or, alternatively, it represents the 
vocalization as causing me now to entertain the thought that the cat is on the mat, the 
difference between these options does matter for present purposes). If so, the content 
                                                
25 For the idea that there is a causally reflexive aspect to the content of perceptual experience, see e.g. 
Searle 2015. (Of course, Searle is not necessarily committed to the specific application of this idea here.) 
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expressed by the vocalization, viz. that the cat is on the mat, is represented in the content of 
auditory experience. But if this content can be auditorily represented as one the vocalization 
prompts me to entertain, it is hard to see why it could not also be auditorily represented as 
what the vocalization means. That is inconsistent with intellectualism.  
Suppose, on the other hand, that the indicated causal consciousness is not supposed to be 
perceptual. Then the trouble is this. We can, it seems, set up a case where Blanche does 
cognitively represent the vocalization as causing her to think that the cat is on the mat, yet 
where there still remains a phenomenal difference with Rosemary. Here is one proposal for 
such a case. Blanche knows, or anyway presumes, that the English subtitles appearing on 
screen are provided by a translator, who hears the Italian speech, and extremely quickly 
writes out the subtitles. She takes the appearance of the English subtitles to cause her to 
entertain the thought that the cat is on the mat, and those subtitles to be caused by the Italian 
vocalization. Since Blanche holds causation to be transitive here, she takes the Italian 
vocalization to cause her to entertain the thought that the cat is on the mat. Since Rosemary’s 
alleged causal consciousness of meaning was not supposed to be perceptual, it seems 
Blanche is in a position to share it. 
It might be objected to this case that there would still be a sense in which Blanche takes 
her entertainment of the thought about the cat and the mat to be only mediately caused by the 
speech, viz. by means of causing the subtitles. Could not the difference from Rosemary, then, 
be that the latter is aware of the speech as immediately evoking a thought of the cat and the 
mat? However, Blanche might come to find a causal connection between the Italian speech 
and the entertaining of the thought about the cat and the mat in some other way than by 
reasoning by transitivity of causation. For example, Blanche might have come mistakenly to 
think, through wishful thinking, being fooled by some quack, hypnosis, or whatever, that she 
is fluent in Italian. She now takes the thought of the cat’s being on the mat to be evoked as 
immediately by the Italian speech as she takes it to be evoked by the English words. Her 
mistaken beliefs cannot, surely, be enough to ensure that she is experiencing the Italian 
speech in the same meaning-laden way as Rosemary is. 
We have considered two ways of trying to capture the phenomenal contrast between 
Rosemary and Blanche in subtitle cases, on a liberal intellectualist view. We have argued that 
each confronts a dilemma. Either the posited representations, allegedly distinctive of 
Rosemary, are held to be perceptual, or they are not. In the former case, they may well be 
distinctive of Rosemary, but the resulting view is no longer intellectualist. In the latter case, 
then, since extra-perceptual, cognitive representations could be arrived in a great variety of 
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ways, including through inference, testimony, wishful thinking, hypnosis, or what have you, 
it seems Blanche may share the representations in question, and that her coming to share 
them, in one or another of the indicated, non-perceptual ways, need not bestow upon her the 
phenomenology characteristic of Rosemary’s registration of the Italian speech. So we have 
yet to find a satisfying intellectualist treatment of subtitle cases, whether conservative or 
liberal. 
 
5. An intellectualist rejoinder, and a perceptualist response 
Now, the intellectualist may object to our treatment of the non-perceptual horn of the 
dilemma outlined at the end of the last section. We have, the intellectualist complains, been 
writing as if any old non-perceptual way in which a representation of meaning properties 
could be arrived at is equal, by intellectualist lights. In particular, we may have seemed to be 
working on the assumption that the key liberal intellectualist suggestion about Rosemary is 
that she has a certain non-perceptual representation of meaning properties, where it is left 
entirely open whether this non-perceptual representation is arrived at by conscious inference, 
from testimony, immediately on the basis of audition, or in some other way. Yet, the 
intellectualist may argue, it matters how this non-perceptual representation is achieved. It is 
characteristic of Rosemary that this semantic representation is precisely not achieved by 
conscious inference, testimony or wishful thinking, but in some other, more immediate way, 
typical of fluent understanding of speech. In contrast, Blanche’s representation of the 
semantic properties of the Italian speech, in so far as she attains one, is arrived not in the 
manner of ordinary fluent understanding, but precisely by an alternative cognitive route. This 
gives the intellectualist room for accounting for the difference between them, or so the 
intellectualist contends. 
However, at this point the perceptualist may make the following response. It is true that 
the fluent comprehension of Rosemary is characterised by a certain form of immediacy as 
compared with the more unordinary manner of understanding achieved by Blanche. Yet, 
when we look more closely at this "certain form of immediacy", characteristic of fluent 
comprehension, we shall find that it brings together a number of features that are 
characteristic of high-level perception. Thus, if high-level perception is genuinely perceptual, 
and the relevant features are suggestive of their classification as such, then the presence of 
these features in fluent comprehension is suggestive of a similar classification of the latter, at 
least until some other, special reason for classifying it otherwise has emerged. In brief, the 
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perceptualist takes attention to the immediacy of fluent comprehension to speak precisely in 
favour of its classification as perceptual. 
The perceptualist may distinguish two ways of approaching this "certain form of 
immediacy" in fluent comprehension, viz. via its phenomenology, or by appeal to facts about 
the sort of psychological processing involved (including computational and neural facts). I 
shall begin by briefly addressing the phenomenological route.  
In a broad sense, cognitive acts could be said to be phenomenologically immediate if they 
are reached with no sense of effort and with no awareness of grounds from which they are 
inferred. Such immediacy is not the preserve of perception. We may suddenly recall isolated 
facts, or the solution to some problem that has been bothering us may strike us out of the 
blue.  Yet, in such cases, what we recall or realise is very often not objectually unified with 
some currently perceived object or event. Even in the cases where there is such unification, 
such as when I am looking at a wooden ladel and suddenly recall it was made by my great 
grandfather, what I am recalling or realizing does not strike me as facts that, as it were, the 
perceived object or event immediately reveals about itself. There is a phenomenological 
dimension to suddenly recalling or realizing something, out of the blue, of (to vaguely 
gesture at it) not being plainly there to be seen straight off. This phenomenological aspect 
may apply to some unusual cases of speech comprehension. Hearing the French phrase, 'Le 
stylo est sur la table', it may suddenly occur to me (who is virtually Frenchless) that it means 
that the pen is on the table (I may speculate this realisation springs from my father joking, 
decades ago, that his mastery of this phase, which he duly explained, demonstrated his 
mastery of French). Yet such cases are clearly phenomenologically quite different from 
ordinary fluent comprehension. In those cases, the meaning seems just there to be heard, at 
once. This is not unlike how an ordinary cup, ordinarily visually presented, strikes us as 
plainly, obviously a cup, its status as a cup being just there to be seen. The kind of immediate 
access to meaning that we have in fluent comprehension thus seems akin a specifically 
perceptual form of immediacy, and to contrast with immediate insights and recollections26. 
An alternative (complementary) approach to the form of immediacy that characterises 
fluent comprehension is via features of the psychological processing involved. Now, in 
section 2.2 above, we observed nine properties that Fodor (1983) puts forward as features of 
                                                
26 To be sure, there is more to be said here. For now, these rough remarks must do as promissory notes for a 
fuller treatment of the sort of immediacy that arises in immediately seeing a cup as such and (I am suggesting) 
in fluent comprenhension, in contrast with the immediacy of sudden recollection or insight.    
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input systems. It does seem that perceptual systems fit this cluster of marks pretty well. I 
shall now review these Fodorian marks. I shall suggest that fluent comprehension fits the 
marks to an extent that is comparable to that to which other, less controversial cases of high-
level perception fits them. 
(i) Fluent comprehension is certainly fast, as perception is. (ii) Fluent comprehension is 
mandatory, in that we cannot help understanding familiar utterances or inscriptions in our 
first language. This shows up notably in the Stroop effect (Stroop 1935). Even if your task is 
merely to identify the colour of the ink in which a word is written, you will inevitably access 
the meaning of the word, if the word is familiar. Thus interference can arise: to name the 
colour of the red ink used to write out “blue” will take longer than if that ink writes out 
“red”. (iii) The ontogeny of language acquisition is widely held to have a characteristic, 
culturally invariant, pace and sequencing. At about 12 months, all normal individuals start 
using single words; around 18 months, telegraphic speech emerges; complex grammar at 24 
months; etc (cf. Stromswold 1999). 
(iv) Language competence shows characteristic and specific patterns of breakdown or 
deficit. Selective impairments here include agrammatism (loss of complex syntax), jargon 
aphasia (loss of complex semantics), alexia (loss of object words), and dyslexia (impaired 
reading and writing), each of which can occur in otherwise cognitively normal individuals 
(Robbins 2015, §1). Of special relevance to the question of perceptualism vs intellectualism, 
there is the very specific deficit of meaning deafness, as Pettit (2010) observes. Patients with 
meaning deafness retain the ability to auditorily identify words, as evidenced by their ability 
to repeat them correctly and sometimes even write them down. In this respect they differ 
from patients with the distinct deficit of word deafness, who fail at auditory word 
recognition. Moreover, individuals with meaning deafness also retain the ability to speak, to 
write and to read. Their specific deficit is in understanding words that they hear. Kohn & 
Friedman (1986) provide the following illustration, from a patient HN (cited from Pettit 
2010, p. 21): 
 
When asked to point to the cup, HN said “cup, cup, C-U-P, cup. What is it?” Finally, he wrote the word 
cup, read it aloud and said “Oh, cup,” and immediately pointed to the cup. The words sink and shelf 
were likewise repeated several times, written, read, and then [the referent] correctly identified (Kohn & 
Friedman 1986). 
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As Pettit argues, meaning deafness is prima facie hard to understand on a view of speech 
comprehension as attained by an extra-perceptual inference. The patient can auditorily 
identify the word, and knows the meaning of the word (as shown by his or her ability to use 
it coherently in speech and understand it when written down). The patient has no general 
cognitive deficits. If normal speech comprehension is a matter of extra-perceptual inference, 
why cannot this patient put the heard word and known meaning together and infer the 
meaning of the speech, thus a normal comprehension? In contrast, on a perceptual view, on 
which, in ordinary fluent comprehension, the assignment of meaning to speech happens no 
later than at a perceptual or even specifically auditory stage, it makes sense how specific 
breakdown, internal to this auditory capacity, could prevent an ordinary sort of 
comprehension of speech. More generally, as Pettit observes, the parallels between meaning 
deafness and other specific deficits in given domains of high-level perception, such as 
prosopagnosia (a disruption to the visual identification of faces), reinforces the commonality 
between ordinary comprehension of speech and high-level perception. 
(v) Fodor held informational encapsulation to be the key feature of modularity. The 
informational encapsulation of a mental function means, roughly, that it is accomplished 
without benefit of information stored outside of the system; the function is implemented 
merely by recourse to an internal database, or what is hardwired into the system. 
Encapsulation implies, but is not implied by, cognitive impenetrability, in the sense of the 
absence of semantically relevant bearing, upon the execution of the mental function in 
question, of information residing specifically in central cognition (cf. Robbins 2015). A key 
evidence for the encapsulation (and hence impenetrability) of perception, for Fodor, is the 
persistence of visual illusions in the face of our recognition of them as misrepresenting how 
things are. This evidence, although telling, is insufficient to establish cognitive 
impenetrability all by itself. Even if perceptions are often resilient in the face of beliefs to the 
effect that they are misrepresentations, there can be various other ways in which beliefs or 
expectations could influence perception. For an analogy: wishful thinking shows that desires 
commonly have a systematic effect on belief, an effect that is non-accidentally sensitive to 
the intentional content of the desires. Belief is, then, not “motivationally impenetrable”. This 
is so even if there may well be certain specific ways in which motivations cannot influence 
belief. It may, in particular, be impossible self-consciously to decide to believe something 
just because one wants to believe it (cf. Williams 1973). Now, as to the question of the 
plausibility of the cognitive impenetrability of perception, this is a large and far from settled 
issue in the cognitive sciences. Suffice it for now to note that at least one of warmest 
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defenders of impenetrability, i.e. Pylyshyn (1999), explicitly restricts impenetrability to what 
he calls “early vision”, i.e., roughly low- to intermediate-level vision, and rejects it for high-
level vision, such as seeing things as members of sortal categories. Defending 
impenetrability for high-level perception would clearly be a considerably more controversial 
claim than for early vision. To just indicate one sort of putatively conflicting evidence here. 
In an experiment by Liu (1976), subjects were showed an ambiguous rat/man figure. Some 
subjects heard in advance a story about rats; they saw the picture as a rat twice as often as 
control subjects27. Again, this is not to deny that our high-level perceptions are quite resilient 
in the face of conflicting beliefs. Shown a convincing wax replica of Tony Blair, which I 
know to be a wax replica, I may still have a visual impression of it as of a person, and even 
as of Blair. 
Turning to comprehension, the situation seems broadly parallel.The manner in which we 
spontaneously comprehend putative cases of speech or writing exhibits at least a fair amount 
of persistence in the face of putatively conflicting beliefs. Azzouni provides some nice 
illustrations: 
 
If a speaker-hearer sees SHE IS RUNNING eroded into the side of a cliff, he experiences it as meaning 
that someone (female) is running. This experience persists in the face of the knowledge that the shape is 
only a result of erosion. 
Or consider this example. While paging through a book in a foreign language you don’t understand 
(although one with the same alphabet as English), imagine you find “She is running,” an accidentally 
orthographically similar expression of this language, next to a picture of a woman running on a bumpy 
road. In such a case, even if you have been told by a native speaker that the sentence actually means, 
“That’s a bumpy road,” you will still involuntarily experience the English interpretation of the sentence, 
in addition with the word “she” saturated by the woman running in the picture. (Azzouni 2013, pp. 93-
94) 
 
These points do not show that speech comprehension is informationally encapsulated or 
cognitively impenetrable. Indeed, if we take speech comprehension to deliver a 
representation of what is said in an utterance, it will plausibly be affected by background 
                                                
27 For review of this and related studies, see Brewer & Loschky 2005. Note that this evidence is not 
invoked here to suggest that low- to intermediate level vision is cognitively penetrated; such an inference 
would clearly take considerable further argument. The suggestion is rather to the effect that, assuming that 
there is such a thing as high-level perception (e.g. in the form of perceiving something as a man, or as a rat), 
then this high-level aspect of perception is susceptible to cognitive penetration. 
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beliefs about the context. For example, as Stanley (2005,  pp. 131-132) notes, if someone 
utters: 
(4)  The policeman arrested the robber. He was wearing a mask. 
we tend interpret the pronoun “he” as referring to the robber, not to the policeman. This 
interpretation surely reflects background beliefs about mask-wearing habits.  
(vi) We saw above that the shallow output that Fodor ascribes to input systems allows that 
we perceive things as members of kinds; in particular, as members of such basic level 
categories as cat, tree, person, etc. (The shallowness, or contrainedness in the sort of 
information it can deliver, resides, for Fodor, in part in the fact that perception will not 
deliver representations of things as answering to such more rarefied theoretical categories as 
proton). Does this extend to comprehension? It might seem not, since it can deliver 
information about whatever people happen to talk about, which might be anything. However, 
as Fodor notes (1983, pp. 88-89), there can still be a constraint here, in that the spoken 
contents presented by comprehension (at least so far as it is a good candidate for being 
perceptual in character) is limited to contents given as what is said in an utterance. In other 
words, comprehension, in so far as it is a candidate for perceptual status, may be limited to 
conveying information about what is more or less literally said, as opposed to what was 
merely implicated. Indeed, as discussed in section 2.1, its output may on occasion by even 
more limited than that, yielding information only on the character of uttered sentences, not 
on what is said therein. As suggested in section 2.2, such representations of the character 
expressed by some utterance are arguably non-conceptual, in that the subject need not 
possess concepts, deployable in her thinking, corresponding to those used in specifying the 
content of the representation. Thus, even if shallowness of output were construed to involve a 
limitation on outputs to ones with nonconceptual content (cf. Carruthers 2006, p. 4), a case 
can be made that at least some representations of meaning properties, delivered by ordinary 
comprehension, share this trait. 
I will address the three remaining Fodorian marks of modularity only very briefly and 
superficially. (vii) Domain specificity, i.e., roughly, the specialization of the process to 
answer questions of a specific kind, and be kicked into operation by a limited range of 
stimuli. As indicated, this can be seen to apply to comprehension, in so far as it is restricted 
to giving answers to the question what someone is saying, and to be triggered by linguistic 
stimuli. (viii) Limited conscious access to interlevels of representation. Speech 
comprehension depends inter alia on discerning the syntactic structure of the uttered 
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sentence, and conscious access to this syntactic structure will often be limited. This gives one 
reason to think this mark applies to comprehension. (ix) Dedicated neural hardware, or 
localizability. Although some brain regions of great importance to comprehension are well 
established, such as Broca’s area and Wernicke’s area, the precise role of these areas, and the 
importance of other brain regions, are matters currently intensely investigated. I will here 
simply reserve judgment on how the case for neural localizability of comprehension 
compares with that for high-level perception. 
To sum up this quick review of the Fodorian marks of input systems: it seems then that 
fluent comprehension meets most or perhaps even all of them to an extent that is comparable 
to the extent to they are met by such high-level perceptual states as when we see thing as 
members of basic level categories (as trees, or cups, or people, etc.). However, are there any 
other features that could be invoked here to argue that, even so ordinary processes of fluent 
comprehension are not perceptual?  
Recently, Block (2014) has argued that a key feature of perceptual processes is their 
susceptibility to sensory adaptation. Sensory adaptation shows up in a range of possible 
sensory aftereffects, and associated illusions. One familiar example is the waterfall illusion. 
After having looked at unidirectional motion for a good while, say at the motions of the 
falling waters of a waterfall, a stationary object will tend to elicit the percept as of movement 
in the opposite direction. This is an example of the motion aftereffect, which exemplifies 
sensory adaptation to the perception of movement. Another example is the tilt aftereffect. 
After having looked at a pattern of left-tilting rectangles for a while, a pattern of upright 
rectangles will elicit a percept as of rightwards tilt. 
Block describes evidence suggesting that sensory adaptation extends to at least some 
forms of high-level perception; specifically, to perceptions of faces as happy, sad, frightened, 
or similarly emotionally engaged. After having looked at an unambiguously angry face for a 
while, an ambiguous face, capable of looking either frightened or angry, is likely to be 
perceived as frightened, and vice versa if an unambiguously frightened face is looked at for 
some time before viewing the ambiguous face. Interestingly, this effect can happen even if 
the ambiguous face differs in various lower-features from the initially viewed unambiguous 
face. This suggests that the effect is not merely due to the representation of the some 
constellation of lower-level features (cf. Butler, Oruc et al. 2008). For Block, this is central to 
the case for regarding would-be perception of faces as being in emotional states as genuinely 
perceptual. 
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Now, does sensory adaptation extend to fluent comprehension? There is, I will suggest, 
some evidence indicating that an aftereffect akin to that discussed by Block for emotion 
perception arises here. The evidence is associated with the phenomenon known as semantic 
satiation, viz. that words somehow “lose their meaning” for subjects after several repetitions. 
The psychologist Titchener described it as follows: 
 
Repeat aloud some word – the first word that occurs to you; house for instance – over and over again; 
presently the sound of the word becomes meaningless and blank; you are puzzled and a morsel 
frightened as you hear it. . . When the word ‘house’ becomes meaningless with repetition, it is because 
the bare sound grows more and more vivid and dominant; like the nestling cuckoo, it drives out its 
normal associates; and these associates, the carriers of its meaning, sink lower and lower into the 
obscurity of the background. So the meaning almost literally, drops off, falls away. (Titchener 1916, p. 
26. Cited from Tian & Huber 2010, pp. 269-277) 
 
The repetition of presentation of a word in semantic satiation is akin to the prolonged staring 
at a stimulus, e.g. with unidirectional movement, in classical cases of sensory adaptation. The 
tendency for meaning thereby to “drop off, fall away”, that Titchener talks about, has been 
documented in tasks that require the subject to join up the word with its meaning. For 
example, a word such as “vegetable” may, after a given number of repetitions, be paired with 
another word that may or may not be related to it in given, semantically significant way, say 
that of standing to it as exemplar to category. The subject’s task is to decide whether or not 
the words are so related, pressing “yes” for “vegetable – cabbage”, say, and “no” for 
“vegetable – oxygen”, say. It has been found that, if “vegetable” has recently been repeated a 
few times, say 2-4 times, subjects are quicker at such tasks than they are for the same task 
with pairs of words semantically unrelated to any just repeated, e.g. with such pair as “sport-
football” (calling for “yes”) or “vehicle-pepper” (calling for “no”). This is priming effect, i.e. 
a facilitation of performance for a targets identical to or semantically closely related to ones 
just presented. However, with an increase in number of repetitions, this priming effect has 
been found to diminish or even be reversed, becoming a “negative priming”. Thus Tian and 
Huber (2010) found that the priming effect went negative after 5-7 repetitions, and even 
more so after 8-10 repetitions28. Such “negative priming” corresponds closely to a sensory 
aftereffect. Huber describes it as a “cognitive aftereffect”:  
 
                                                
28 An earlier study, Black 2001, found a decrease in (positive) priming with increasing repetitions, but did 
not document negative priming. 
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Similar to visual aftereffects that produce a positive or negative afterimage as a function exposure 
duration, cognitive aftereffects exist that can enhance or cause deficits for primed stimuli as a function 
of prime duration. (Huber 2008, p. 343) 
 
In calling it “cognitive”, however, Huber is emphatically not intending to suggest that the 
kind of process involved here is relevantly different from that in classic cases of sensory 
adaptation, such as the motion aftereffect:  
 
This [i.e. to use the phrase ‘cognitive aftereffect’, AN]is (?) not to say that cognitive aftereffects involve 
cognition per se or are due to a strategic thought process. Instead, the claim is simply that the dynamics 
commonly observed for low-level perception can exist for other types of processing. In this manner, 
cognitive aftereffect is used as a catch-all phrase for all sorts of aftereffects that exist in the process of 
identification. (Huber 2008, p. 343) 
 
The work of Huber and collaborators, then, on semantic satiation and other related forms of 
positive and negative priming, provide one source of evidence that something very much like 
sensory adaptation applies even to comprehension.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Price (1953) described our everyday recognition of things around us, such as when we 
recognise an airborne object flapping past as a bird, in the following terms: “It is at once 
thought and perception. It is a form of cognition in which ideas or concepts are somehow 
blended with immediate experience” (Price 1953, p. 90) 
I find this a suggestive gloss on fluent comprehension. Fluent comprehension is, at least 
often, thought, in that often involves grasping a proposition as what is said in an utterance. In 
grasping this proposition, we are enabled to entertain, suppose, question, or judge true the 
proposition in question. We can and do entertain it in thought. At the same time, fluent 
comprehension has a range of hallmarks of perception - at least of high-level perception. It 
fits at least most of the Fodorian marks of input systems about as well as other, less 
controversial cases of high-level perception. There is evidence indicating that fluent 
comprehension exhibits, in the guise of semantic satiation, a form of aftereffect akin to 
sensory adaptation. Fluent comprehension yields, in a certain phenomenologically immediate 
way, roughly gestured at early in the last section, representations of meaning properties that 
are phenomenally objectually unified with perceptually presented lower-level properties, 
such as loudness and pitch. In sum, this gives some grounds for thinking that fluent 
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comprehension just is a special case of high-level perception. The best bet on the question 
whether fluent comprehension is a case of thought or perception may be that it is both. 
However, I do not here purport to have offered a case for perceptualism as preferable, all-
things-considered, to its negation. For one thing, I have not considered objections to 
perceptualism, such as O’Callaghan’s (2011) objection from homonyms29. For another, I 
have not addressed the question whom, if any, of the perceptualist and the intellectualist that 
has the burden of proof. If Siegel's and Bayne's abductive, contrast-based argument for 
liberal perceptualism, from which we have departed, can be regarded as putting the burden 
on the intellectualist, then our argument in sections 2-5 here can be read making a case that 
the intellectualist, at least so far, has failed to lift that burden. Yet it might be asked why the 
burden should not rest instead on the perceptualist: why not hold that it is up to her positively 
to show fluent comprehension to be perceptual? I do not purport to have lifted that burden 
here. Firstly, I have been working on the supposition that some forms of high-level 
perception, e.g. seeing things as cups or trees, or people as happy or sad, are genuinely 
perceptual. Secondly, I have not argued that the three aspects of immediacy discussed in the 
last section - viz. (i) the phenomenological feature of exhibiting a certain, roughly indicated 
sort of immediately delivered, objectual unity between certain higher-level features (in our 
case: that of meaning such-and-such) and low-level, uncontroversially sensible properties, 
(ii) being a good fit for the Fodorian marks of input systems, and (iii) exhibiting such 
aftereffects as are found in semantic satiation - add up to a sufficient condition for perceptual 
status, or even add up to such a status conditionally the indicated cases of high-level 
perception being genuinely perceptual. I have merely suggested these three aspects speak in 
favour of that classification. The further defence of these suppositions must however await 
another occasion30. 
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